A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C.S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian measures of confirmation can be ruled out. In closing, another application of my account to the problem of evidential diversity is also discussed.
. . . two arguments which are entirely independent, neither weakening nor strengthening the other, ought, when they concur, to produce a[n intensity of] belief equal to the sum of the intensities of belief which either would produce separately.
Two crucial intuitions about independent inductive support are contained in this quote. First, there is the intuition that two pieces of evidence E 1 and E 2 provide independent inductive support for a hypothesis H if the degree to which E 1 supports H does not depend on whether E 2 is part of our background evidence (and vice versa) . In our confirmation-theoretic framework, we will take this intuition onboard as a definition of (mutual) confirmational independence regarding a hypothesis:
Definition. E 1 and E 2 are (mutually) confirmationally independent regarding H according to c iff both c(H, E 1 | E 2 ) = c(H, E 1 ), and c(H, E 2 | E 1 ) = c(H, E 2 ).
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The second intuition expressed by Peirce in this passage is that the joint support provided by two pieces of independent evidence should be additive. In our confirmation theoretic framework, this gets unpacked as follows:
(A ) If E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H according to c, then c(H, E 1 & E 2 ) = c(H, E 1 ) + c(H, E 2 ).
Strictly speaking, we should weaken A to require only that c(H, E 1 & E 2 ) be some (symmetric) isotone function f of c(H, E 1 ) and c(H, E 2 ), where f is additive in some (isotonically) transformed space. 6 The point is that, if E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H according to c, then c(H, E 1 & E 2 ) should depend only (and, in some isotonically transformed space, linearly) on c(H, E 1 ) and c(H, E 2 ), without any extra "interaction terms". This leads to the following refinement of the second basic Peirceian intuition:
5 James Joyce and Patrick Maher (private communications) have both voiced concerns about whether this is an accurate reading of Peirce. They worry that Peirce is talking in this passage not about the degree of incremental confirmation c(H, E), but about the posterior probability Pr(H | E). While this may be true (as a psychological fact about Peirce -although Good 1983 and Schum 1994 seem to think otherwise), this would not undermine the cogency of my subsequent arguments. For, I intend only to take Peirce's somewhat vague statements as a historical inspiration for my own account. However, it is interesting to note that, if Peirce is talking about the posterior probability here, then his requirement of additivity in cases where Pr(H | E 1 & E 2 ) = Pr(H | E 1 ) = Pr(H | E 2 ) makes no sense, since in such cases: Pr(H | E 1 & E 2 ) = Pr(H | E 1 ) = Pr(H | E 2 ) = Pr(H | E 1 ) + Pr(H | E 2 ). So, I consider my reading of this passage to be a rather charitable one. Moreover, the definition of confirmational independence I am adopting is a natural and (pre-theoretically) intuitive one. Interestingly, many researchers in artificial intelligence have adopted the very same definition. They call it 'modularity' -see, e.g., Horvitz and Heckerman (1986) and Heckerman (1988) .
6 As Peirce did, I prefer to have f be +. So, I have defined r and l using logarithms (see footnote 2). If we were to drop the logarithms in our definitions of r and l, then we would have f = · for the ratio measures r and l, but f = + for the difference measure d. See Heckerman (1988) for more on the kind of linear decomposability that is at the heart of desideratum A. So, at this most basic level, the three most popular varieties of quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are in agreement about the nature of independent evidence. All three measures d, r, and l satisfy the fundamental Peirceian desideratum A (and A ). However, measure s would seem to be inadequate in its handling of independent evidence, even at this most basic level.
(A)
There exists some (symmetric) isotone function f such that, for all E 1 , E 2 , and H, if E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H according to c, then c(H, E 1 & E 2 ) = f[c(H, E 1 ), c(H, E 2 )],
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The agreement between d, r, and l ends here. In the next section, I will describe a symmetry desideratum which is satisfied by d and l (and s), but violated by r. This will narrow down the field further to two measures (d and l) which seem to cope adequately (at a very basic level) with independent evidence. Later, I will propose additional, probabilistic constraints on accounts of independent evidence that narrow the field even more.
A Negation Symmetry Desideratum
If two pieces of evidence are confirmationally independent regarding H, then they should also be confirmationally independent regardingH. Negation symmetry in the confrimational independence relation seems highly intuitive.
9 After all, if the degree to which E 1 confirms H doesn't depend on whether E 2 is already known, then why should the degree to which E 1 confirmsH depend on whether E 2 is already known? In our confirmation theoretic framework, this intuitive negation symmetry principle gets formalized as follows:
The following theorem states that each of our four Bayesian relevance measures -except r -satisfies S. Carnap's (1962, §67) relevance measure r also violates A (proof omitted). See Fitelson (1999) and Eells and Fitelson (2000b) for other unintuitive features of Carnap's measure r.
8 See Eells and Fitelson (2000a, 2000b) for other unintuitive features of s. 9 Many varieties of independence satisfy this kind of negation symmetry requirement (e.g., both logical independence and probabilistic independence are negation-symmetric).
10 This theorem is closely related to a result reported in Eells and Fitelson (2000b) which says that each of our four Bayesian relevance measures -except r -satisfies the following hypothesis symmetry condition:
The two high-level desiderata A and S narrow the field of four relevance measures down to two (d and l) which seem -so far -to explicate the concept of independent evidence. 11 Next, I will propose a low-level, probabilistic constraint that rules out the difference measure d and all other relevance measures, except those ordinally equivalent to the log-likelihood ratio measure l. Sober (1989) discusses an example in which two pieces of evidence E 1 and E 2 seem -intuitively -to provide independent support in favor of a hypothesis.
Screening-Off and Confirmational Independence
12 In Sober's example, E 1 is a newspaper report of the outcome H of a baseball game, and E 2 is an (causally) independently derived radio report of the (same) outcome of the same baseball game. It is assumed that each of E 1 and E 2 individually confirms H. Sober explains that the (intuitive) probabilistic structure of this example is a conjunctive fork, in which E 1 and E 2 are joint effects of a common cause H. Sober also points out (as Reichenbach 1956 , page 159 first did) that E 1 and E 2 will not be unconditionally probabilistically independent in such a case. So, it can't be probabilistic independence of the evidence simpliciter which is responsible for our intuitive judgment that E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H in Sober's example. Is there some probabilistic feature of Sober's example which undergirds our intuition? It seems to me (as it did to Sober) that the relevant point is that (in the terminology of Reichenbach 1956 , page 189) H screens-off E 1 from E 2 . That is, it is the fact that E 1 and E 2 are probabilistically independent conditional on the hypothesis H (and its denial) that undergirds our intuition that E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H.
Sober's conjunctive fork example provides informal motivation for the following two central points concerning the nature of confirmational independence and its intuitive relation to probabilistic screening-off:
• Confirmational independence is inherently a three-place relation. That is, when we say E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H, we are not saying that E 1 and E 2 are unconditionally independent of each other. We are talking about a kind of (ternary) independence that depends crucially on the hypothesis H.
• Screening-off of E 1 from E 2 by H is (intuitively) intimately connected with confirmational independence of E 1 and E 2 regarding H.
In the next section, I will describe a more general, probabilistic model that is intended to make the connection between probabilistic screening-off and confirmational independence more precise. This formal model will also allow us to generate concrete, numerical examples which will, ultimately, be used to show that only the log-likelihood ratio measure l properly handles the (general) relationship between probabilistic screening-off and confirmational independence.
A Formal Model
To formally motivate the general connection between probabilistic screening-off and confirmational independence, I will use a simple, abstract model. I will call this model the urn model. 13 The background evidence for the urn model is assumed at the outset to contain the following information:
An urn has been selected at random from a collection of urns. Each urn contains some balls. In some of the urns the proportion of white balls to other balls is x and in all the other urns the proportion of white balls is y, 0 < x, y < 1. The proportion of urns of the first type is z, 0 < z < 1. Balls are to be drawn randomly from the selected urn, with replacement.
Let H be the hypothesis that the proportion of white balls in the urn is x. Let W i state that the ball drawn on the i th draw (i ≥ 1) is white. I take it as intuitively clear that W 1 and W 2 are mutually confirmationally independent regarding H, regardless of the values of x, y, and z. Hence, I propose the following adequacy condition for measures of degree of confirmation:
(UC) If c is an adequate measure of degree of confirmation then, both
for all urn examples, regardless of the values of x, y, and z.
14 What probabilistic feature of the urn model could be responsible for the (presumed) fact that W 1 and W 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H? The feature cannot depend on the values of the probabilities involved, since we did not specify what these are except to say that they are not zero or one (a requirement imposed to ensure that the relevant conditional probabilities are all defined). Moreover, as we saw in Sober's example, the feature cannot depend on the unconditional probabilistic independence of W 1 and W 2 , since W 1 and 13 The urn model is due to Patrick Maher. 14 Ellery Eells (private communication) worries that for extreme (or near extreme) values of x, y, or z, this intuition might break down. He may be right about this (although, as a defender of l, I will insist that any such breakdown can be explained away, and is probably just a psychological "edge effect", owing to the extremity of the values of x, y or z, and not to considerations relevant to their confirmational independence per se). However, in the Appendix (Theorem 3), I show that the measures d, r, and s fail to obey this intuition, even in cases where the values of x, y, and z are all arbitrarily far from extreme. As a result, d, r, and s will not even judge E 1 and E 2 as confirmationally independent regarding H in Sober's example. This seems unintuitive, and should cast doubt on the adequacy of d, r, and s. W 2 will not, in general, be independent of each other (e.g., if each of W 1 and W 2 individually confirms H). This does not leave much. Two considerations that remain are that the following two identities hold in all urn examples:
Identities (1) and (2) 
I find (SC) an attractive principle; but, for the purposes of this paper, I will use only the weaker (and perhaps more intuitive) adequacy condition (UC).
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The following theorem states that the only measure among our four measures d, r, l, and s that satisfies (UC) is the log-likelihood ratio measure l:
Theorem 3. The measures d, r, and s violate (UC), but l satisfies (UC).
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Thus, only the log-likelihood ratio l satisfies the low-level, probabilistic screeningoff desideratum. I think this is a compelling reason to favor the log-likelihood ratio measure over the other measures currently defended in the philosophical literature (at least, when it comes to judgments of confirmational independence regarding a hypothesis).
17 As such, this provides a possible (at least, partial) solution to the problem of the plurality of Bayesian measures of confirmation described in Fitelson (1999) . In the next section, I will discuss another application of my account of independent evidence. 15 Heckerman (1988, page 19) has suggested an adequacy condition that is equivalent to (SC). He gives no justification for this principle. I take the urn model to be a partial justification of (SC). However, I prefer the present approach since it makes use only of the weaker (and, I think, more intuitive) (UC). Incidentally, I do not think that screening-off by H is a necessary condition for mutual confirmational independence regarding H (neither does Heckerman). I discuss this issue further in the Appendix, when I prove Theorem 3.
16 Heckerman (1988) claims to prove a much more ambitious, and closely-related result. He claims to show that only measures that are ordinally equivalent to l satisfy (SC). Unfortunately, his argument is fallacious for subtle mathematical reasons -see Halpern (1996) . In particular, Heckerman's argument presupposes that an agent's probability space is infinite, and satisfies some rather strong (unmotivated) mathematical constraints (Halpern 1996 (Halpern , pages 1318 (Halpern -1319 . Unlike Heckerman's argument, my argument makes use only of the finitistic adequacy condition (UC), and requires no additional, strong mathematical presuppositions.
17 The intimate connection between probabilistic screening-off of the kind described here and our intuitive judgments of independent inductive support has been pointed out by several recent authors (and used by some a reason to favor likelihood-ratio based measures of support), including: Good (1983) , Pearl (1988) , Heckerman (1988) , and Schum (1994) .
3 An Application to Evidential Diversity
Philosophers of science dating back at least to Carnap (1945) have shared the intuition that collections of evidence that are 'diverse' or 'varied' should (ceteris paribus 18 ) confirm more strongly than collections of evidence that are 'narrow' or 'homogeneous'. I have elsewhere (see Fitelson 1996) called this the confirmational significance of evidential diversity (CSED). I suspect that the notion of independent evidence can undergird, at least partially, (some of) our intuitions about the significance of diverse evidence. At least one recent philosopher of science seems to share this suspicion. Sober (1989) shows (essentially 19 ) that the log-likelihood ratio measure l satisfies the following condition:
It is a direct corollary of Theorem 1 that -according to all three measures of confirmation d, r, and l -two pieces of independent confirmatory evidence will always provide stronger confirmation that either one of them provides individually. In other words, we have already shown that the three most popular measures of confirmation d, r, and l all satisfy D. It seems to me that D could be used to provide a rather simple and elegant (partial 20 ) Bayesian account of CSED. The basic idea behind such an approach would be that it is not evidence of different 'kinds' per se that will boost confirmational power. Rather, it is data whose confirmational power is maximal, given the evidence we already have that are confirmationally advantageous. And, D provides a robust, general sufficient 21 condition for this sort of confirmational boost. It is not generally the case (as was pointed out by Carnap 1962 ) that two pieces of confirmatory evidence simpliciter will always provide stronger confirmation than just one. With D, we have identified a very general sufficient 18 See Fitelson (1996) for an elaboration of the ceteris paribus conditions that are tacitly presupposed in the Bayesian explication of CSED offered by Horwich (1982) . I will later discuss the ceteris paribus clauses implicit in Howson and Urbach's (1993) 'correlation' approach to CSED. Carnap's original (1945, page 94 ) explication of CSED also requires some rather sophisticated ceteris paribus conditions. But, since Carnap's original account of CSED does not make use of any of the measures d, r, l, or s, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
19 Strictly speaking, Sober proves something weaker than this. He proves that l satisfies the consequent of D under the stronger (wrt l) assumption that H screens-off E 1 from E 2 . Our result is also more general than Sober's in the sense that it applies not only to l but to d and r as well (i.e., our result D is not as sensitive to the choice of measure of confirmation).
20 I do not mean to suggest that confirmational independence can be used to undergird all of our intuitions about the value of diverse evidence. But, I do think that there are many important scientific cases that fit this mold. For instance, the intuition that evidence from independent domains of application (e.g., celestial vs terrestrial domains) of a theory often confirm more strongly than the same amount of evidence from domains of application that are not independent is a canonical example of the kind of intuition I have in mind here. Moreover, Sober (1989, page 124) explains how the notion of independent evidence regarding a hypothesis can be useful in the context of phylogenetic inference (e.g., the problem of inferring the character states of ancestors from the observed character states of their descendants).
21 As was the case with (UC) and (SC), I am not claiming that D is a necessary condition for increased confirmational power in this sense (indeed, it is not -proofs omitted).
condition for increased confirmational power. One nice feature of this sufficient condition is that it does not depend sensitively on one's choice of measure of confirmation. Below, I compare the present approach to CSED with a recent Bayesian alternative proposed by Howson and Urbach (1993) . Howson and Urbach (1993) propose a different way to account for our intuitions about CSED.
Comparison with the 'correlation' approach
22 This approach asks us to consider not whether E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H. Rather, Howson and Urbach (1993) suggest that the important thing is whether or not E 1 and E 2 are unconditionally stochastically independent. Howson and Urbach (1993, pages 113-114, my italics) summarize the their 'correlation' account as follows:
Evidence that is varied is often regarded as offering better support to a hypothesis than an equally extensive volume of homogeneous evidence . . . According to the Bayesian, if two data sets are entailed by a hypothesis (or have similar probabilities relative to it 23 ), and one of them confirms more strongly than the other, this must be due to a corresponding difference between the data in their probabilities . . . The idea of similarity between items of evidence is expressed naturally in probabilistic terms by saying that e1 and e2 are similar if P (e2 | e1) is higher than P (e2), and one might add that the more the first probability exceeds the second, the greater the similarity.
This means that e2 would provide less support if e1 had already been cited as evidence than if it was cited by itself.
The most charitable interpretation of the above proposal of Howson and Urbach would seem to be the following rather complicated nested conditional: (H) If the following probabilistic 'ceteris paribus clause' is satisfied:
24
In other words, Howson and Urbach are claiming that (ceteris paribus 25 ) pieces of evidence E 1 and E 2 that are unconditionally positively correlated will not be confirmationally independent regarding a hypothesis H (and, that E 1 and 22 Earman (1992) discusses a similar approach. Basically, many of the same criticisms will apply to his account. I will focus on the account of Howson and Urbach, since their characterization of the 'correlation' approach is closer in spirit to my presentation. See Forster (1995) for some independent criticisms of Earman's particular 'correlation' explication of CSED. 23 Howson and Urbach's parenthetical remark that their 'ceteris paribus condition' can be weakened to Pr(E 1 | H) = Pr(E 2 | H) = Pr(E 1 &E 2 | H) -while preserving the general truth of the main tenet of their account of CSED -is false. See footnote 36 in the Appendix (in the proof of Theorem 4) for a proof that this parenthetical remark is incorrect.
24 In fact, Howson and Urbach seem to be making an even stronger, quantitative claim. They seem to be saying that if (CP ) is satisfied, then the greater Pr(E 2 | E 1 ) is than Pr(E 2 ), the lesser c(H, E 2 | E 1 ) will be than c(H, E 2 ). I have chosen to criticize the (weaker) qualitative interpretation H, since H's falsity entails the falsity of the stronger, quantitative claim. 25 Howson and Urbach's (CP ) is just a bit stronger than the probabilistic ceteris paribus clause that is needed to shore-up Horwich's (1982) account of CSED -see Fitelson (1996) .
9 E 2 will tend to cancel each other's support for H in such cases). I see several serious problems with Howson and Urbach's proposal H.
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As we have already seen in Sober's conjunctive fork example, pieces of confirmationally independent evidence will often be unconditionally positively correlated (and often strongly so). Newspaper reports (E 1 ) and radio reports (E 2 ) about the outcome (H) of a baseball game often fail to be unconditionally independent. This does nothing to undermine our intuition that E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H. Moreover, this example is representative of a wide range of cases. The conjunctive fork structure is common in (intuitive) examples of confirmational independence. For example, consider what doctors do when they seek independent confirmation of a diagnosis. They look for confirmationally independent corroborating symptoms. Such symptoms will typically be unconditionally correlated with already observed symptoms. But, conditional on the relevant diagnostic hypothesis, confirmationally independent symptoms will tend to be stochastically independent. It is conditional independence that is relevant here, not unconditional independence.
At best, Howson and Urbach have shown (via H) that confirmational independence and unconditional stochastic dependence cannot co-occur in the extreme, deductive cases in which (CP ) holds.
27 If H were true for an interesting class of Bayesian confirmation measures c, then Howson and Urbach's account would, at least, provide some useful information about the relationship between confirmational independence and unconditional stochastic independence in the case of deductive evidence. Unfortunately, as the following theorem states, among the four measures we have considered, Howson and Urbach's H is satisfied only by the log-ratio measure r, which we have already shown to be inadequate when it comes to judgments about confirmational independence.
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Theorem 4. H is true if
Howson and Urbach must either embrace the unattractive option of defending the measure r, or they must defend some other measure of confirmation which satisfies H. 29 In either case, Howson and Urbach must reject the general connection (SC) between screening-off and confirmational independence, since (SC) and H are logically incompatible. That is, in the case of deterministic conjunctive forks, (SC) and H cannot both be true.
30
26 Note that Howson and Urbach's H only purports to explain why a lack of evidential 'diversity' can be bad. H cannot tell us why or how evidential 'diversity' can be good. 27 The fact that odd things can happen in such extreme cases was pointed out by Sober (1989, page 279) . There, Sober explains that many of the salient epistemological differences between independent and dependent evidence collapse in the extreme (deterministic) case.
28 Myrvold (1996) has independently articulated some of these same criticisms of Howson and Urbach's account. Moreover, Myrvold nicely shows how to remedy many of these problems, by being sensitive to conditional independence (as well as unconditional independence). While this is certainly a step in the right direction, the new 'correlation' account presented in Myrvold (1996) is still strongly sensitive to the (inadequate) choice (r) of measure of confirmation.
29 This would probably not be an easy task. Other than r (or measures ordinally equivalent to r), all relevance measures I have studied violate H. See Appendix §D for more on H.
30 This is easily proved. Assume that (CP ) obtains (which implies that H screens-off E 1 from E 2 ). In such a case, H, E 1 , and E 2 will form a (deterministic) conjunctive fork. Now, if
Summary of Results
The following table summarizes the main results reported in this paper. 
Conclusion
I have outlined a general Bayesian account of confirmationally independent evidence regarding a hypothesis. At its heart, this account traces back to the pioneering work of C.S. Peirce. I have shown that a wide variety of (but, surprisingly, not all) Bayesian measures of degree of confirmation satisfy the most basic Peirceian desiderata for adequate accounts of independent inductive support. I have also applied the idea of confirmational independence to two important problems in Bayesian confirmation theory: (i ) the problem of the plurality of Bayesian measures of confirmation (as described in Fitelson 1999) , and (ii ) the problem of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity (as described in Fitelson 1996) . I suspect that other useful applications of the present account of confirmational independence await discovery.
Therefore, in the case of deterministic conjunctive forks, (SC) and H cannot both be true. ❑
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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1 Proof. This proof has four parts. 31 The proofs for d and r are easy:
The proof for l is only slightly more involved. For the l case of the theorem, we will prove that the likelihood ratio (λ) is multiplicative under the assumption of confirmational independence. That the logarithm of λ (i.e., l) is additive under the assumption of confirmational independence then follows straightaway.
The s case of the theorem is the trickiest, because it requires us to show that there is no (symmetric) isotone function f such that, for all E 1 , E 2 , and H, if E 1 and E 2 are confirmationally independent regarding H according to s, then
, where f is linear in some (isotonically) transformed space. Happily, I have proven the following much stronger result: ( * ) There exist probability models M 1 and M 2 such that: 
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ❑
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Each of the measures d, l, and s satisfies S, but r violates S.
32 The probability models in this Appendix were found and verified using˛ˇ.
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Proof. This proof has four parts. The d, l, and s cases reduce to trivial algebraic identities (due to space limitations, I won't include here the easy proofs for these cases). For the r case, we need to show that there exists a probability model M such that: (i ) both r(H,
Here is one such model M (due to space limitations, I omit the computational details).
M
Pr(H &Ē 1 &Ē 2 ) = 1 64
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. ❑
C Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. The measures d, r, and s violate (UC), but l satisfies (UC).
Proof. For the d, r, and s cases of the theorem, it will suffice to produce an urn example (i.e., an assignment of values on (0, 1) to the variables x, y, and z) such that either c(H, For the l case, we will show that l satisfies the stronger condition (SC).
It is easy to show that, for any of the three measures d, r, or l (but not for s), c(H, E 1 | E 2 ) = c(H, E 1 ) iff c(H, E 2 | E 1 ) = c(H, E 2 ). That, together with the reasoning above, completes the l case, and with it the proof of Theorem 3. ❑ 33 y can be arbitrarily close to 1 2 , while preserving the counterexample. See footnote 14. 34 It is interesting to note that l does not satisfy the converse of (SC), or the converse of (UC). This is why I do not take screening-off to be necessary for confirmational independence. c = r, but H is false if c = d, c = l, or c = s. 
D Proof of Theorem 4 Theorem 4. H is true if
35
Proof. For the r case of the theorem, we begin by assuming that the probabilistic 'ceteris paribus clause' (CP ) is satisfied. That is, we assume: Pr(E 1 | H) = Pr(E 2 | H) = Pr(E 1 & E 2 | H) = 1. Then, we apply (CP ), the definition of r, and Bayes' Theorem to derive the following pair of probabilistic facts: Finally, we assume that E 1 and E 2 are positively correlated under Pr. Or, more formally, we assume that Pr(E 2 | E 1 ) > Pr(E 2 ). In conjunction with facts (3) and (4) above, this yields r(H, E 2 | E 1 ) < r(H, E 2 ), as desired.
36
For the d, l, and s cases, it will suffice to produce a probability model in which (i ) Pr(E 1 | H) = Pr(E 2 | H) = Pr(E 1 & E 2 | H) = 1, (ii ) Pr(E 2 | E 1 ) > Pr(E 2 ), but (iii ) c(H, E 2 | E 1 ) ≥ c(H, E 2 ), for c = d, c = l, and c = s. The following example does the trick. A card is drawn at random from a standard deck. Let H be the hypothesis that the card is the Q♠, E 1 be the proposition that the card is either a 10 or a face card, and E 2 be the proposition that the card is either a ♥, or the Q♠, or the 9♠. Due to space limitations, I omit the calculations which show that this example has the desired properties (i )-(iii ) listed above.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4, as well as the Appendix. ❑ 35 H is also false for Carnap's (1962, §67) relevance measure r (as the example below shows). 36 Notice that Howson and Urbach's claim that (CP ) can be weakened even further to (CP ) Pr(E 1 |H) = Pr(E 2 | H) = Pr(E 1 & E 2 | H) -while still preserving the truth of the c = r case of Theorem 4 -is false. If we only assume (CP ), then we will need to establish that Pr(E 2 | E 1 ) > Pr(E 2 ) Pr(E 2 | H)
, in order to prove that r(H, E 2 | E 1 ) < r(H, E 2 ). Unfortunately,
does not follow from the fact that E 1 and E 2 are positively correlated under Pr, unless one also assumes that Pr(E 2 | H) = 1, which brings us back to (CP ).
